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believe that there may be more ground for Dr. Rashdall's criticism than I formerly thought, but I still believe that the view of reason in the moral life as "will" or "practical reason" (employing the latter term not quite in the Kantian sense) which includes not only the purely discursive processes, but also a synthetic organization of the emotions and sentiments in a coherent whole, enables us to present a view of the moral consciousness that is both rational and objective. This conception I may have been wrong in reading into Professor McDougall's account. I do not know. At any rate it ought to be there.

Along this line the *Social Psychology* needs another supplementary chapter, dealing with the organic character of the *individual* mind.³⁹ Even in infancy, the mind is a whole, though an undifferentiated whole. It is not a chaos of developed but disorganized emotions. With its normal development into a moral personality, the various instincts and emotions (including the social instinct, and the instinct of thought) become differentiated and organized into sentiments. This organization as a whole is what in ethics we mean, when we regard it intellectually, by the reason; and, when we look at it expressed in action, by the will; and when we regard it as the structural constitution of a man's mind, by his character. The self-psychology of Miss Calkins seems to me capable of furnishing an admirable means of approach to this problem.

Taken all in all, the *Introduction to Social Psychology* remains, after the twelve years since its first appearance, the foundation for a psychological interpretation of human social life. During this time its author has done much to broaden this foundation. While the doctrines need modification here and there, and further application and development everywhere, this book seems, to one admirer at least, by far the most important contribution to this field that has yet been made in the present century.

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THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE elements favored us, and the counter-attractions of New York City proved in most cases not too great for the philosopher's powers of resistance. To that degree the twentieth meeting of the American Philosophical Association may be accounted a success. Not that New York, or any metropolis, is quite the proper place

³⁹ The organic character of the *social* mind is recognized in the *Group Mind* (*e.g.*, pp. 10-12; 22-26; 78-80; 214, ff; 240-242).

for philosophic congregation. There is here no fitting atmosphere of leisure, nor other advantages that come with remoteness from the main currents of modern and practical life. But if certain external inducements were therefore lacking for the fullest surrender to the claims of the speculative, the programme prepared by the executive committee succeeded uncommonly well in fixing attention upon those human concerns which are unaffected by the vicissitudes of place and circumstance.

We were called upon to grapple with problems of modern logic; to analyze the function of education; to define epistemological dualism, relativity, individualism; and most extensively of all to consider the role of the philosopher in modern life. Not all of these topics, to be sure, proved conducive to complete philosophic tranquillity and intellectual enthusiasm. The austerity of certain of the subjects goaded one member to plead for a double programme in future meetings so that those taking delight in highly technical discussion might have their way without trespassing upon the comforts of others inclined to meditate upon humaner matters; and the apparently innocuous topic chosen for special consideration threatened quite unforeseen conflict and disquiet even before Professor Woodbridge disturbed the serenity of those engaged upon the definition and praise of the philosopher by his protest that it was pitiful indeed if at this our twentieth celebration we could do nothing more useful or more self-respecting than to ask what it is to be a philosopher. All was not harmony; nor all enthusiasm. And such degree of protest and division of opinion as was publicly voiced in all probability bulked small in comparison with the violent dissent on subject after subject which rankled in the minds of many, but for lack of time found no expression. Not that concord within any philosophical association need be secured by universal agreement upon all important matters. It is only when disagreement extends to something so fundamental as the very constitution and aims of philosophy itself that there is cause for actual alarm. In the opinion of the present writer the revelations at this last meeting of American philosophers were such as to justify alarm.

Relatively unimportant perhaps in this connection was the difference of opinion as to whether philosophy is metaphysics, and whether metaphysics includes logic, psychology and theory of morals. In one sense, that is, the question was a verbal one. Nobody impugned the reality of psychology, logic or ethics as departments of knowledge, any more than they impugned the reality of metaphysics. Strong feelings were nevertheless aroused as to the propriety or impropriety of the various classifications suggested. But it was when values were set upon the different domains and the aims of

philosophy explicitly defined that disagreements arose which could be accounted serious. The issue was clearly fixed when Professor Drake came forward with his view that, while the contemplation of ideas is justifiable in that it satisfies a harmless human impulse, it is valuable only as a genteel substitute for chess—the really important thing, the one valuable thing, being the solution of social problems. Though this came only as a brief comment from the floor, it may be taken as an unambiguous expression of the practical attitude approved by a number of those present, the attitude which without unfairness may be called in the last analysis anti-intellectualistic. Be it remembered that it was definitely a question as to the duties of the philosopher in his official capacity and in private labor, and incidentally therefore as to the place of philosophy in education and in life. In justice to Professor Drake and to many who were in agreement with him it should be admitted that what they wished to advocate was perhaps, theoretically at least, not a subordination for all time of the claims of the intellect to those of active life. With the final solution of all social ills they would undoubtedly hope for a true renaissance of intellectualism when intellectual exercise could question, however, is whether a postponement of the cultivation of be sincerely rated as something more significant than play. The pure metaphysics *for its own sake* until society needs no further improvement and practical problems are all solved, might not mean a postponement forever, or at best a postponement of such duration that whatever purely disinterested metaphysical curiosity the human mind possesses would have dried up or been drained off beyond recall into the service of other and more “useful” activities.

Expressions of an opinion strongly opposed to that of Professor Drake came from the leaders of the discussion. Professor Pratt, in his appeal for a greater sense of consecration to the task of teaching and research, went so far as to deplore participation by the philosopher in any kind of political propaganda. In his opinion the philosophic function is literally and strictly to foster the life of the spirit. Again, Professor Mecklin denied that the philosopher is a social reformer, declaring his task to be untrammelled theorizing activity requiring speculative imagination and critical reason. Dr. Cabot, instead of wishing, as a professional public benefactor might have been expected to wish, for a curtailment of impractical philosophic training and study, urged rather that more courses, more teachers, more hours be devoted to the subject. He stressed the point that the attainment of new ideas which is the object, though rarely achieved, of discipline in thinking, involves a painful process not unlike an operation; and that it is not for the teacher of philosophy to try to make that operation less painful. Professor Powell, without ad-

vocating metaphysical operation for its own sake, practised it brilliantly in his comparison of the tasks of the philosopher and the lawyer. The latter, he declared, is, like the metaphysician, often involved with hypothetical entities of his own creation and in need of philosophic criticism. Unlike him, he is trammelled in his judgments by precedent and inhibited by a sense of the irrevocable future consequences of his own decisions. Whereas the philosopher is care-free and happy, living in the present, the student of law has to live at once in past, present and future, constantly making points which establish a line. Decisions of lawyers, then, constitute a body of practical ethical judgments which should be of great interest to the ethicist. Professor Woodbridge's protest against the whole discussion, which followed Professor Powell's contribution, produced a shock. To some it appeared as heresy; to others as a sane and needed check upon an argument that had reached its limit of usefulness. It served in any case to give a new turn to the topic—one to which for lack of time justice could not be done. This was the question of historical research and the teaching of the history of philosophy.

As a matter of fact the few who rose to their feet and uttered their opinions appeared to be in perfect unanimity in the matter. Two or three spoke in behalf of more and better teaching of the history of philosophy, and Professor Creighton echoed the lament of Professor Woodbridge that too few serious historical studies are submitted to the *Philosophical Review* and other publications. The final word in the chorus of agreement came from Professor Riley who undertook to suggest topics for historical research which in his opinion might well engage the attention of the student of philosophy. The compilation of a history of American Art (as more profitable and sensible than the study of *empfindung* and other theoretical questions) was one suggestion; the study of the history of sumptuary laws was another. No one in the audience arose to point out to Professor Riley that the history of art is neither psychology nor esthetics and that still less is it philosophy. Either the majority agreed with him; or they were too staggered to make reply. Professor Creighton, it is to be recorded with thanksgiving, did protest with regard to a history of sumptuary law that it would be history and not philosophy. But the whole big problem upon which attention had alighted for a moment and from which it had then glanced off—the problem of the place and the importance of the history of philosophy in the study of philosophy—was dropped, and we heard no more of it. And yet, judging from the scanty evidence of the present writer's unvoiced questions and criticism, and the unvoiced questions and criticisms of a few others, there was here no philosophic concord and unity of opinion. Indeed, the kind of disagreement that further pursuit of

the topic would have brought out was precisely the kind that, as was remarked above, is cause for real alarm. That one group of philosophers are materialists, another vitalists; that some incline to idealistic epistemology, others to realistic; that certain men are pragmatists and the rest are not—all this is probably advantageous for the search for truth. But that on such a question as the significance of historical research in philosophy for philosophy itself there should be sharply opposed opinion, is quite another matter. There is no space here for recording the hypothetical controversy that might have taken place, but didn't. And yet even in the briefest account of the philosophical meetings just past it is more than barely relevant to comment upon a matter, touched upon though not discussed, and of the intensest interest to all concerned. That comment is as follows:

More than any previous age of human life this is an historical age. It is an age dominated by the concept of evolution. And while historical interest and historical method made possible the vindication of the evolution hypothesis, that hypothesis has in turn reinforced historical interest and encouraged historical habits. Now the evolutionary viewpoint has meant increased intellectual emancipation, a loosening of the fetters of dogma, a greater readiness for shift of opinion in the face of a shifting world. To the pragmatic movement with its use of the concept of evolution is due much of the renewed emphasis within the field of philosophy upon the historical method which has been productive of such fortunate consequences. That method, when applied to the study of ethics, was adapted to make for greater liberality in the evaluation of any given code by drawing attention to the impermanence of all codes and their startling multiplicity. When applied to the study of epistemology and metaphysics, it served to emphasize the variety of possible epistemological and metaphysical viewpoints and the dangers of an over-hasty conclusion that one's own particular epistemology and metaphysics was destined to be the final one. The importance of history, of the history of human opinion, for developing a philosophic spirit of free inquiry, has been recognized anew and received new demonstration. What then of the argument that philosophers should bend their energies to increased historical research? It is likely, to be sure, that there are interesting matters as yet uninvestigated regarding the lives of the thinkers of the past and regarding the circumstances under which they developed their ideas (though it is less likely that there still remain unlisted any important varieties of metaphysical theory originated by those thinkers of the past which would serve to enrich the background of the thinkers of the present).

It is likely also that most young students of philosophy are better fitted to do a creditable bit of work of an historical nature than to originate a metaphysical system. What then? Shall the mature student of philosophy likewise devote himself to the amassing of history, and still more history? Is, after all, history of philosophy, philosophy? The chemist would scarcely admit that the history of mediæval theories and practise, including alchemy, constitutes an important part, or even a genuine part, of present-day chemistry; the psychologist would argue similarly about the subject-matter of psychology, and the mathematician about mathematics. Even the historian would declare it to be a small part of the concern of history to record its own past—to make a history of history. That a young person, or even a mature one, is better able to cope with an historical problem than to produce an original philosophic idea would not seem to prove that history, even the history of philosophic ideas, is philosophy. The most that it might suggest is that the young person, or the older one, might be in the wrong niche altogether, might be really an historian and not a philosopher at all. If Miss Calkins was correct in her definition of metaphysics—that it is an attempt, by reason, to get at ultimate reality—then surely it would seem that—provided the historians of philosophy have really made a compilation of all the important theories that have in the past been held regarding the nature of the good, the true, and the beautiful with a view to envisaging *all possible* theories, in the hope of finally arriving at the *true theory*—it would be well to advocate *less* fresh historical research rather than more, as a substitute for philosophy itself, that is. When philosophers in cooperation with scientists have actually determined the complete nature of ultimate reality—an achievement not likely to occur this side of the infinite—then of course it will be quite proper to return to biographies both of men and of theories, and glorify them forever. If, by that time, the theory of art is quite settled, we may also resort to the history of art, even American art; and perhaps history proper will at last have nothing to do but investigate its own history. Only, if Miss Calkins's definition still stands, the philosopher's activity will then result in nothing but history, likewise the esthetician's, while history itself will have an eternity of leisure for the swallowing of its own constantly augmenting tale.

It is time to return to a brief mention of the other topics offered for consideration at the first and later sessions of the conference. Professor Mitchell's paper on "Formalism in Logic," which set forth an ingenious method for reclassifying and combining the fundamental propositional relations of traditional logic, elicited technical

comments and questions from several members of the association. The same was true of Professor Lewis's brilliant paper on "The Structure of Logic and its Relation to Other Systems," in which the thesis was defended that no single set of demonstrable postulates can properly be called ultimate, and that any attempt to demonstrate the validity of logical principles must of necessity be circular since the principles discussed will themselves be employed in the demonstration. Professor Lewis made an interesting point about classes supposed falsely to include themselves, to the effect that when a judgment about the nature of propositions is expressed propositionally, that judgment does not have as part of its domain of reference the proposition expressing it—the supposition that it does being due to the gratuitous introduction of a further judgment that the proposition in question *is* a proposition, which in turn would involve a definition of propositions in general.

Professor Cohen by his paper entitled "Some Philosophical Aspects of Physical Relativity" plunged us into abstruse and difficult questions upon which everyone nowadays is supposed to hold some opinion. His main point seemed to be that even Einstein's own views of relativity do not involve a denial of an absolute. The absolute admitted is however not a substance, but consists rather of the system of the invariant relations of nature, comparable to the Logos underlying the Heraclitean flux. Taking into account the complete system of reference of any measurement, that measurement will then be absolute and unchanging, just as a mathematical formula will then be absolute within one limited system of postulates though "untrue" or meaningless within another. Professor Spaulding, leading the discussion of the paper, offered an analysis of the philosophical significance of relativity on his own account, pointing out that space appeared to have attributed to it a dynamic function to take the place of the function formerly ascribed to gravitation, while for the old absolute ether had been substituted an "ether of events"—none of all this serving however as a proof of subjectivism. As a conclusion to the morning session, Professor Sellars read a paper on "Epistemological Dualism *vs.* Metaphysical Dualism" in which he spoke of the importance of distinguishing between naïve and critical realism, the former of which falsely identifies the physical object with the content of perception, while critical realism is dualistic, admitting that we know the external thing despite the fact that it does not enter as content of the experience. The copy theory may, he contended, be escaped by a recognition that the content of perception contains merely the "gross structure" of the external world.

The afternoon session, at which the topic of the rôle of the phi-

philosopher was started, was followed by a reception to the association by President and Mrs. Butler, this in turn being followed by dinner at Westminster Hotel and the brilliant address, "The Appeal to Reason," by the president, Professor Perry. As was said repeatedly the following day, we should have been amply supplied with material for discussion if we could have confined ourselves for the remaining sessions to the ideas formulated in this address. Nevertheless we returned dutifully the next morning to the appointed programme and after concluding the discussion about the philosopher listened to Professor Montague's vivid account of the International Congress held at Oxford in September, at which he, as chairman of the American delegation, and Professors Hoernlé and Boodin had described the present situation in philosophy in America.

At the final session Professor Townsend treated the topic "Education as Criticism," reaching the pessimistic conclusion that while criticism as opposed to dogmatism is the ideal of education, it has failed in that it has been employed not as an end but as an instrument of will and the desire for power. Professor Ferguson, treating of "A Supposed Dualism in Plato" offered an intricate and interesting analysis of the allegory of the cave in the seventh book of the *Republic*, for the purpose of showing that Plato merely states there the two stages of education and is not offering a classification of objects. Professor Lodge, under the title "The Reference to Reality in Modern Logic," attempted a reconciliation of Pragmatism and Absolute Idealism. And finally, in a paper on "The Philosophical Basis of Mr. Fite's Individualism," Professor Symons convicted Mr. Fite of inconsistency in postulating a harmony to be attained between egoistic impulse and self-realization through social relations, such harmony, in Mr. Symons's view, necessarily presupposing a social consciousness and a monistic system which Mr. Fite would deny.

The members of the association went their way, not regenerated perhaps, but at least stimulated by the interchange of ideas. There were gaps in the ranks. Professor Hoernlé had deserted us for a professorship at Durham, England, and Professor Overstreet, in recent years so closely identified with all the activities of the association, was absent in California. Both were missed, as well as Professor Sheldon, the president for the coming year, Professor Bode, this last year's vice-president, and many others. Of those who had gathered for the annual consideration of the problems of philosophy, there surely was none who, as the sessions broke up, failed to feel in an unusual degree unworthiness and sharp regret for all philosophic shortcomings. In this age, when more than ever before there is need

of reason and ripeness of judgment in a distracted world, the shortcomings of the philosopher impress one as a genuine calamity. In this age, that is productive at once of savage brutalities, ingenious sophistries in defense of outworn traditions, unprecedented greed for material goods and alarming increase of control by unintelligent and fanatical minorities, what indeed promises salvation but the development of those qualities that Professor Gardiner hailed as the product of the philosophic habit and temper of mind: poise and moderated passion and prejudice; and ability to clarify ideas, to reconcile apparent contradictions and to formulate and develop ideals? If philosophers, set somewhat apart by training and by natural concern for the generic and unchanging aspect of things, are themselves unsure of their function, at variance regarding method, and inclined, any of them, to doubt the worth of those intellectual interests which it is their task to guard and cherish—then indeed is the outlook for the future even darker and more ominous than the facts of contemporary history incline one to fear.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Religious Consciousness: A Psychological Study. JAMES BISSETT PRATT. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1920. Pp. x + 488.

This "study" is in fact a general work on the psychology of religion. The contents range from a preliminary analysis of the notion of religion and of the psychology of religion through a discussion of the subconscious and of society and the individual to the specific topics of religious growth, conversion and revivals, belief in God and in immortality, the cult, prayer, and mysticism. The plan of the work differs in three respects from that of others in which much the same topics appear: First, mysticism receives especially full treatment (almost a third of the book); second, the material is drawn almost exclusively from highly developed religions; third, within this field the author's policy tends toward fulness of descriptive detail rather than toward the finally adequate analysis that includes origins and early forms.

Certain unquestionably excellent results have been achieved by this unusual plan. In particular, the work is unique for range and variety of data within its chosen field, and for sympathetic appreciation of diverse types of religious belief and practise. Professor Pratt has taken pains to obtain first hand knowledge of such facts not only in our western environment but also in India, and he has consistently